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STUDENT ARTICLE
Why All the Wine-ing? The Wine
Industry's Battle With States over the
Direct Shipment Issue
By Scott F. Mascianica*
I. Introduction
The clash of privileges between the dormant Commerce
Clause' and the Twenty-First Amendment2 of the Constitution has
existed since the amendment was ratified on December 5, 1933. After
Prohibition, 3 wholesalers were subject to individual state laws that
regulated the sale of alcohol within a state and how alcohol was
imported into the state.4 The majority of states adopted a mandatory
three-tier distribution system for the sale of alcoholic beverages.5
Under the mandatory three-tiered system, producers of alcoholic
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.B.A.
Finance, 2002, University of Michigan. The author would like to thank his family
and friends for their love and support.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.").
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (giving states the authority to regulate "[t]he
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
3 U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The Twenty-
First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which
prohibited the importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors.
4 David H. Smith, Consumer Protection or Veiled Protectionism? An
Overview of Recent Challenges to State Restrictions on E-Commerce, 15 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 359, 366 (2003).
5 Id.
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beverages are permitted to sell only to state-licensed wholesalers. 6
The wholesaler then may sell only to licensed retailers, who in turn
sell the alcohol to consumers.7 Consequently, under these state
alcohol regulatory schemes, both in-state and out-of-state producers
may sell alcohol to consumers in two ways: 1) obtaining a state
issued license to sell alcohol or 2) shipping the beverages through the
mandatory three-tier system.8
Many states have provided in-state wineries with.an exception
to the three-tier system, permitting them to ship directly to in-state
consumers. 9 Out-of-state sellers condemn this preferential treatment
because the extra costs they incur under the three-tier system are
avoided by in-state sellers.' The regulation of alcohol distribution
has been particularly troublesome for wine connoisseurs because they
cannot purchase wine using e-commerce and they are essentially
barred from receiving direct shipments of wine from out-of-state
wineries. 
1 1
The direct shipment conflict has produced a flurry of support
on both sides and is just another issue to fall into the scope of the
ongoing dispute between the dormant Commerce Clause and Section
2 of the Twenty-First Amendment. The majority of the federal circuit
courts have ruled on this issue and overturned the direct shipment ban
as a discriminatory measure. 12 However, diverging from the other
6 Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate Regulation of Interstate
Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1621 (2000).
7 id.
8 Russ Miller, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and
State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REV.
2495, 2497-98 (2001).
9 Id.
10 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1623 (discussing the flurry of debate between
out-of-state wineries and states over the depth of the Twenty-First Amendment
power to regulate alcohol.).
" Miller, supra note 8, at 2496.
12 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 514-515 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming the
lower court's finding that North Carolina's statutory scheme discriminates between
in-state and out-of-state wineries, violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved
by the Twenty-First Amendment); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (1 1th
Cir. 2002) (finding that Florida's alcohol distribution statutes' differentiation
between in-state and out-of-state wineries facially discriminates against interstate
commerce and remanding for further fact-finding on whether Florida's statutory
scheme is "necessary to effectuate the... core concern in a way that justifies
[Vol. 17:1
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circuits, the Seventh Circuit found Indiana's state alcohol distribution
scheme constitutional.13 In Swedenburg v. Kelly, the Second Circuit's
decision followed Seventh Circuit's precedent, upholding New
York's statutory scheme and setting the stage for the Supreme Court
to rule on the direct shipment controversy. 14 The Supreme Court
granted writ of certiorari in the Swedenburg case on May 24, 2004,
but chose to limit their analysis to the following question: "Does a
State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to
ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state
wineries to do so violate the Dormant Commerce Clause in light of
Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?"'
15
Part II of this article analyzes the history of the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment, outlining the
creation of their conflict. Part III explores the history of the recent
circuit court decisions on this conflict and how the ban on out-of-
state direct shipment has impacted consumers. Part IV investigates
the Swedenburg v. Kelly opinion and the Second Circuit's reasoning
in its controversial decision. Finally, Parts V and VI analyze the
Second Circuit's deviation from traditional jurisprudence in reaching
its decision, the effect of the divided decisions on consumers, and
how the Supreme Court will likely address this issue in the
Swedenburg case.
treating out-of-state firms differently"); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 403-07
(5th Cir. 2003) (finding that Texas's ban on direct shipment by out-of-state
wineries violates the dormant Commerce Clause and that the state failed to
demonstrate how a statutory exception for local wineries was justified by any of the
traditional core concerns); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 525 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that it was obvious the Michigan regulatory process discriminated against
out-of-state wineries and unnecessarily burdened interstate commerce).
13 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Indiana's ban on direct shipments was constitutional because the
statute did not discriminate between in-state wineries and out-of-state wineries).
14 See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
New York's regulatory scheme is valid given that they are targeting a valid state
interest in controlling the importation and transportation of alcohol and this is
within the ambit of the Twenty-First Amendment).
15 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3600, 72 U.S.L.W 3722, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No.
03-1274).
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II. The Legislative Provisions Behind the Wine-ing
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
At the end of the Revolutionary War, the United States
Government did not have the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 6 The states enacted laws for their own benefit, resulting
in what the Supreme Court classified as a "conflict of commercial
regulations, destructive to the harmony of the states." 17 In an effort to
promote the economic development following the war, the
government inserted the Commerce Clause into Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the Constitution. 18 Clause 3 gives Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes. ' 19 The negative implication of this
federal grant of power was the removal of states' ability to regulate
20commerce among the several states, referred to as the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Long before Congress addressed the need for Prohibition and
its subsequent repeal by the Twenty-First Amendment, two acts
16 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571
(1997).
17 Id. (quoting Justice Johnson from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 224
(1824)). It should be noted that although Justice Johnson's opinion was only the
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens in his majority opinion of Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 571, stated that the Court "subsequently
endorsed" Justice Johnson's view. Id.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). As remarked in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 575, the Supreme Court noted the test for a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is when a state law facially
discriminates against interstate commerce, the court has a per se rule of invalidity.
Additionally, Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that where the state law is
nondiscriminatory, but still affects interstate commerce, there is a balancing test
where the law will be sustained unless the burden on commerce outweighs the
putative local benefits. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 596 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))
(emphasis added).
20 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 571 ("In short, the
Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of the States." (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
252 (1946))).
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expressly dealt with alcohol regulation: the Wilson Act of 189021 and
the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913.
22
B. From State Regulation to Prohibition and Back
According to the Wilson Act of 1890, all intoxicating liquors
or liquids transported into a state would be subject to the state's laws
"to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or
liquors had been produced in such [s]tate. ' 23 The Wilson Act went
further, stating that the liquors "shall not be exempt therefrom by
reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise." The Wilson Act remained the piece of legislature
governing state alcohol regulation until it was extended with the
25passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913. The Act stated that any
State could regulate the in-state sale of liquor to "any person
interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
used.
26
The Webb-Kenyon Act remained in force for six years until
Prohibition became the law when the Eighteenth Amendment was
ratified on January 16, 1919.27 States had little need to individually
regulate the alcohol industry after the ratification of the amendment.
Yet, several years later, Congress reversed course and repealed
Prohibition with the Twenty-First Amendment.28 Additionally,
Congress included language of the Webb-Kenyon Act in Section 2 of
the amendment.29
21 Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C § 121 (1890).
22 Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1913).
23 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890).
24 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890).
2' 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1913). The Webb Kenyon Act was instituted by Congress
in order to account for a loophole in the Wilson Act. For a full discussion, see
Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Company, 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
26 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1913).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 ("After one year from the ratification of this
article, the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.").
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
29 See id. ("The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or
2004]
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The passage of the Twenty-First Amendment signified the
return of state regulation and the creation of the three-tier distribution
system. The aim of the structure was to prevent large alcoholic
beverage producers from "dominat[ing] local markets through
vertical and horizontal integration... ,30 Although originally
adopted to prevent the operation of illegal liquor empires,31 the three-
tiered structure remains in effect for most states to the present day.
C. North Dakota v. United States
Disputes over the validity of the three-tier distribution
structure have led to dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the
states' power to regulate alcohol. The Supreme Court held that
alcohol regulation is purely the province of the states within a state's
own borders.32 Specifically, the Court held that "[i]n the interest of
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and
raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive system for
the distribution of liquor within its borders."33 However, the Court
limited this authority, stating that states do not have this authority
outside the borders of the state.
34
D. The Supreme Court's Framework To Resolve Conflict
Between The Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court created a two-part framework to assess
whether the regulation of alcohol distribution fell within the states'
core interests. First, a court must determine whether a statute was
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
30 Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law.: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.
L. & POL. 63, 64 (2001).
3' Lorde Martin, supra note 30, at 63-64 (noting that the "primary purpose of
the system was to prevent organized crime-which had run illegal liquor empires
during Prohibition-from dominating the legalized liquor industry.").
32 United States v. North Dakota, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1986).
33 Id. at 432.
34 Id. at 431.
35 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1984) ("rWhether the
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers
reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail,
notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal
[Vol. 17:1
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facially discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause.3 6 If the
legislation was not discriminatory, the state regulation did not
conflict with the Constitution and the statute was valid. However, if a
conflict between the provisions did exist, the court was required to
determine whether any non-discriminatory alternatives were
available.3
7
If the court failed to find any non-discriminatory alternatives,
then the legislation was subject to a balancing test, where the benefits
and costs of the regulatory scheme were weighed against one another,
and the statute may be upheld at the court's discretion. 38 On the other
hand, if non-discriminatory measures were available, then the court
would consider the statute in light of the Twenty-First Amendment.
39
Using the core principles in North Dakota v. United States, the court
must then determine if the state regulation could be saved under the
Twenty-First Amendment.40
III. The Wine-ing Begins: The Circuit Courts Split on
Direct Wine Shipment
In each of the circuit court cases discussed below, the general
issue was that consumers could not obtain alcohol, specifically wine,
directly from out-of-state producers under a state's mandatory three-
tier distribution system.4' In the years following Prohibition, there
policies." (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984))).
36 See id. at 275 ("It is clear by now the Amendment did not entirely remove
state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause.")
37 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)
("When discrimination against commerce.., is demonstrated, the burden falls on
the State to iustify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake").
38 See generally Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (reasoning that the legislation will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on intrastate commerce outweighed the "putative
local benefits.").
39 Bacchus Imp., 468 U.S. at 275 (recognizing that the court would look at the
state's Twenty-first Amendment interests and determine "whether the principles
underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated by the [State
regulation] ... to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise
be offended.").
40 Id. at 274.
41 See Lloyd C. Andersen, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause
2004]
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was explosive growth in the total number of alcohol wholesalers.42
However, this growth was stifled by immense consolidation in the
wholesaling industry.43 The entire alcohol industry was affected by a
series of alliances and mergers with one exception-the wine
industry, which experienced a large increase in the number of small
wineries in recent decades. 4 The resulting dichotomy between the
large wholesalers and small wineries created a conflict due to
differences in market strategy, economies of scale and business
goals.45 Wholesalers are hesitant to purchase from small, low volume
wineries because they do not offer the bulk volume sales to produce
sufficient profits.46 With wholesalers buying less from these small
wineries, small wineries cut out the middleman as a means of
economic survival and used the Internet to ship directly to
customers.
47
Retailers joined wholesalers in their attack on direct shipment
as both parties fought for their vested interests inSreventing out-of-
state wineries from selling directly to consumers. Sensing that the
direct shipment of wine posed a threat to their share and composition
of the market, these parties demanded states enforce laws that
prohibited the direct shipment of alcohol.49 The wine industry
responded by filing suits in federal courts, seeking to overturn state
laws that permitted in-state producers to ship directly to consumers,
but prevented the same action by out-of-state wineries.
50
This conflict of interests produced five circuit court cases that
preceded the Swedenburg decision. Four of these cases overturned
and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L.
REv. 1, 3 (2004).
42 Anderson, supra note 41, at 3.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 Anderson, supra note 41, at 3.
48 See Miller, supra note 8, at 2546 (Retailers "have a strong interest in
legislation that restricts competition, like direct shipments.").
49 See id. ("Legislatures are motivated to pass direct shipment laws by desires
to appease these influential lobby groups.").
50 Andersen, supra note 41, at 3-4.
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the bans on out-of-state shipments, 5 1 while only one circuit upheld
the ban prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Swedenburg.
52
A. Fourth Circuit: Beskind v. Easley
In Beskind v. Easley, an out-of-state California winery and
group of individual wine consumers brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of North Carolina's Alcoholic Beverage Control
("ABC") Law.53 They challenged the section of the law addressing
the direct shipment of wine to consumers. 54 The law prohibited out-
of-state wine manufacturers from selling and shipping directly to
consumers, and barred North Carolina residents from receiving out-
of-state wine without a wholesale permit.55 In addition, the North
Carolina law required non-resident wine vendors to obtain a permit
even to sell to wholesalers, while the local wineries could ship
directly to consumers.56
The winery indicated its willingness to obtain a license and
remit taxes to North Carolina to satisfy the state requirements of
direct shipment because it would not be economically feasible for
them to go through the three-tier system.57The plaintiff's argument
asserted that North Carolina's ABC law violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because the state gave in-state wineries the
competitive advantage of direct shipment to consumers while out-of-
state wineries were denied this privilege.
58
In analyzing the history of the Twenty-First Amendment and
the Commerce Clause, the Fourth Circuit agreed that with the
passage of the amendment, "some power to regulate interstate
51 See e.g., Beskind 325 F.3d at 517 (affirming the lower court's finding that
North Carolina's statutory scheme discriminates between in-state and out-of-state
wineries, violates the Commerce Clause, and is not saved by the Twenty-First
Amendment).
52 See Bridenbau~h, 227 F.3d at 853 (holding that "wine originating in
California, France, Australia, or Indiana passes through the same three tiers and is
subjected to the same taxes. Where's the functional discrimination?").
53 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 509.
54 Id.
15 Id. at 510.
56 Id.
" Id. at511.
5' Beskind, 325 F.3d at 510.
2004]
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commerce was withdrawn from Congress so that the Commerce
Clause could not be construed to prevent the enforcement of State
laws regulating the importation of alcoholic beverages and the
manufacture and consumption of alcoholic beverages within State
borders." 59
Following the precedent established in North Dakota, the
court recognized that Congress has the power to regulate interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause. 60 The Fourth Circuit
followed the Supreme Court two-step framework, stating that:
All components of the dormant Commerce Clause remain
in force unless a 'core concern' of the Twenty-First
Amendment is implicated. When such a concern is
implicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional
cloud from the challenged law so long as the state
demonstrates that it genuinely needs the law to effectuate
its proffered core concern. In no event can the law directly
regulate extraterritorially; nor can a law ever be motivated
by mere economic protectionism.
6 1
In its Commerce Clause analysis, the court held that because
the law resulted in preferential treatment of in-state economic
interests, the facial examination of the statute left little doubt that
those laws were discriminatory. 62 The court adopted the district
court's view that "[n]o equilibrium can be achieved when economic
protectionism is placed on one side of the scale, and the Commerce
Clause's need to preserve the respect of the several states for each
other is placed on the opposite side" 
63
Next, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether North Carolina's
59 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 513 ("The Twenty-First Amendment sanctions the
right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from 'without,
unfettered by the Commerce Clause." (citing Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132,
138 (1939))).
60 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 513 ("It is by now clear that the Amendment did not
entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the
Commerce Clause." (citing Bacchus Imp., 468 U.S. at 275)).
61 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514 (quoting Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112).
62 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514.
63 Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472-73 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Gordon
Eng, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balancing the Twenty-
First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of
Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1849, 1890 (2003).
100 [Vol. 17:1
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scheme advanced a legitimate local purpose that could not be
adequately served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives.
64
The court found at least two non-discriminatory alternatives to the
statute: (1) require the in-state wines to pass through the three-tier
system or (2) permit out-of-state wines to engage in direct shipping. 65
The court then turned its attention to whether the ABC law
violated the Twenty-First Amendment.66 The Fourth Circuit held that
North Carolina failed to identify any Twenty-First Amendment
interest that would be served by authorizing the in-state wineries to
sell and ship directly to consumers. 67 Because North Carolina's
statutory scheme discriminated against out-of-state interests while
non-discriminatory alternatives existed, and failed to pursue any of
the core concerns under the Twenty-First Amendment, the Fourth
Circuit found the scheme was unconstitutional.
B. Sixth Circuit: Heald v. Engle
In Heald v. Engler, the Sixth Circuit addressed similar issues
involving a Michigan state alcohol regulation.6 8 In Heald, an out-of-
state winery, wine connoisseurs, and wine journalists brought an
action against Michigan state officials alleging that the state's alcohol
regulations were unconstitutional.69 Similar to North Carolina's law
in Beskind, the Michigan law required out-of-state wineries to obtain
an "outstate [sic] seller of wine license., 70 The licensing procedure
forced the out-of-state wineries to sell to wholesalers before selling to
consumers.71 The Michigan law included an exception for in-state
wine producers, permitting the delivery of their products to customers
without a "specially designated merchant license." 72 In addition, the
legislation offered further benefits to in-state wineries as the out-of-
state winery license cost $300.00, compared to the in-state license
64 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514 (citing Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994)).
65 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 515.
66 Id. at 516.
67 Id. at 517.
68 Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2003).
69 id.
70 Id. at 521.
71 id.
72 id.
2004]
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price of only $25.00.73 The Sixth Circuit found the regulation was not
''a proper exercise of Michigan's Twenty-First Amendment authority,
despite the fact that such a system places a minor burden on interstate
commerce."
74
Finding that the law was facially discriminatory, the court
applied what it termed the "proper approach" to analyzing this
scenario: apply the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis
and, if the provisions are unconstitutional, determine whether the
state offered no reasonable nondiscriminatory means to support a
"core concern." 75 According to the court, the regulation clearly
benefited in-state wineries to the burden of out-of-state wineries by
giving the Michigan wineries greater access to consumers.76 The
court noted the possibility that an out-of-state winery could be shut
out of the state all together if it could not find a wholesaler.77
The court then turned its focus to the statute's validity in light
of the powers conferred to the states in the Twenty-First
Amendment. 78 In analyzing Michigan's law, the court found that the
discrimination did not further the core concerns permitted by the
amendment.79 Specifically, the court noted that
[i]t is important to keep in mind that the relevant inquiry is
not whether Michigan's three-tier system as a whole
promotes the goals of temperance, ensuring an orderly
market, and raising revenue, but whether the discriminatory
scheme challenged in this case-the direct-shipment ban
for out-of-state wineries-does so.
80
The Sixth Circuit held Michigan's law was facially
discriminatory and gave in-state wineries a competitive advantage
7 Heald, 342 F.3d at 521.
14 Id. at 524.
75 id.
76 Id. at 525.
7" Id. at 525.
78 Heald, 342 F.3d at 526.
79 id.
80 Id.; see Beskind, 325 F.3d at 517 (holding that "the question is not whether
North Carolina can advance its regulatory purpose by imposing fewer burdens on
in-state wineries than out-of-state wineries... Rather, the question is whether
discriminating in favor of in-state wineries... serves a Twenty-first Amendment
interest.").
[Vol. 17:1
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over the out-of-state wineries. 81 Because this discrimination did not
further any of the core concerns, the statute was therefore
unconstitutional. With this decision, the Sixth and Fourth Circuits
were in agreement over the direct shipment issue.
C. Fifth Circuit: Dickerson v. Bailey
The Fifth Circuit followed suit and addressed the direct
shipment issue in a manner similar to the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.
83
In Dickerson, a group of oenophiles brought suit against the
Administrator of the Texas Alcohol and Beverage Commission
("TABC") to challenge the Texas alcohol regulation that prohibited
direct shipment to consumers by out-of-state wineries.8 4 The
oenophiles charged that the discrimination against out-of-state
wineries gave an economic advantage to in-state wineries.
85
The court applied the North Dakota two-step analysis and
found that the structure of the alcoholic beverage industry is designed
to aid Texas in the regulation and control of alcohol consumption.
86
However, in its Commerce Clause analysis, the court found that the
regulation was facially discriminatory because in-state wineries were
permitted to deal directly with Texas consumers in both selling and
shipping wines. 87 For example, Texas wineries could sell up to
25,000 gallons of wine annually directly to Texas consumers without
any per-customer restrictions." In contrast, a Texas resident was
prohibited from personally bringing into the state more than three
gallons of wine purchased from an out-of-state vintner.
89
Additionally, Texas wineries were permitted to ship directly to a
Texas consumer any portion of the 25,000 gallons of wine that they
have sold to the consumer, but out-of-state wineries were prohibited
from shipping directly to any Texas resident, and may face criminal
81 Heald, 342 F.3d at 521.
82 Id. at 524.
83 Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
84 Id. at 392.
85 Id. (citing TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01 (2001), 107.12 (2001)).
86 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 398.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 397-98 (construing TEX. ALCO. BEv. CODE ANN. § 16.01(a) (2001)).
89 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 398 (construing TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §
107.07(a) (2001)).
2004]
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penalties if they did so. 90
Focusing on the disparity between the gallons permitted to in-
state and out-of-state vintners, the Fifth Circuit found the Texas law
to be facially discriminatory. 91 The court recognized that even those
out-of-state wineries could only export to wholesalers that had a
permit to import.92 Moreover, not only did the TABC Administrator
fail to identify the lack of any non-discriminatory measures to justify
the discriminatory provisions, but the legislative intent of the statute
was to "help the Texas wine industry., 93 Therefore, the court
concluded that it was clear the TABC provided the in-state wineries
with a competitive advantage by permitting them to evade the
regulatory scheme.
94
The court next analyzed the TABC legislation to determine if
it could be saved by the Twenty-First Amendment's core-concerns
privilege.95 The court determined that the TABC Administrator gave
"lip service to the core concerns analysis under the Twenty-First
Amendment" and did not properly address the balance between the
Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. 96
Given that the administrator chose to challenge the process rather
than offer any core concerns to support the regulation, the court
found that the sole purpose of Texas scheme was economic
protectionism, and was thus unconstitutional.97
D. Eleventh Circuit: Bainbridge v. Turner
In Bainbridge v. Turner, the Eleventh Circuit faced a similar
case disputing the constitutionality of Florida's ABC law and applied
90 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 398 (construing TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §
107.07 (2001)).
91 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 398.
92 id.
93 id. at 402 (noting that "under the two-tiered Commerce Clause analysis,
however, the Administrator must establish the absence of any available alternative
methods for enforcing any otherwise legitimate policy goals of the TABC.")
(emphasis added).
94 id.
9' Id. at 404.
96 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 405-06. The Administrator argued that Texas
discriminatory restrictions were exempt from all judicial scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause. Id.
97 Id. at 406-07.
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the North Dakota two-step analysis.98 In Bainbridge, wine
consumers, along with out-of-state wineries, brought an action
challenging Florida's statutory scheme.99 Florida's law permitted an
exception to its three-tier structure as it allowed in-state wineries to
receive vendor permits and ship directly to consumers. 100 Meanwhile,
out-of-state wineries were not only prohibited from shipping directly
to consumers,101 but violators were potentially subject to treble
damages and criminal prosecution.'
0 2
The Eleventh Circuit stated that it would abide by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bacchus Imports and Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. in analyzing the Florida law. 0 3 However, the court
fashioned an exception to the two-step analysis, noting that when "a
statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates
evenhandedly, [the court will examine] whether the State's interest is
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeds the local benefits."'
10 4
The court determined that Florida's scheme could not
withstand the first level of scrutiny in the analysis.10 5 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that the rule was facially
discriminatory where it allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to
consumers if they had a permit to do s0.1°6 Therefore, the law could
only be saved if there were not any non-discriminatory measures that
would serve a legitimate state purpose.' 07 Florida, however, could
offer a similar provision to out-of-state wineries, and thus cure the
98 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (1lth Cir. 2002).
99 Id.
'00 Id. (construing Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 561.22(1) (1997), 561.221(1)(a)(1994)).
01 Id. at 1107 (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.54(1)(1997)).
'02 Id. at 1107 (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.54(2)(1997)).
103 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1108-09 (stating that they would rely on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bacchus Imp. and then use the two-step analysis in
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986)); See generally Bacchus Imp., 468 U.S. at 263 (applying the analytical
framework used by Supreme Court).
104 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476
U.S. at 579).
'05 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1109-10.
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discriminatory aspect of the law.' 08
In its analysis of the Twenty-First Amendment, the court
noted that "[t]he Amendment is thus treated as though it permits
states to enact some laws banning the importation of alcoholic
beverages even though such laws might, without the Twenty-first
Amendment, violate the dormant Commerce Clause." 109 The
Eleventh Circuit then reevaluated the conflict, noting that the
amendment did alter the dormant Commerce Clause, but did not fully
insulate states from scrutiny.' 10
Ultimately the Fifth Circuit's view of the case was similar to
the aforementioned circuits as it held
All components of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
remain in force unless a "core concern" of the Twenty-First
Amendment is implicated. When such a concern is
implicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional
cloud from the challenged law so long as the state
demonstrates that it genuinely needs the law to effectuate
its proffered core concern. In no event can the law directly
regulate extraterritorially; nor can a law ever be motivated
by "mere economic protectionism."' 1
If Florida could demonstrate a core concern, e.g., raising
revenue, ensuring orderly markets, and protecting minors, the state
may be able to withstand the Commerce Clause challenge."' The
Court held that before a state could resort to the Twenty-First
Amendment protection, the state "must show that its statutory scheme
is necessary to effectuate the proffered core concern in a way that
Justifies treating out-of-state firms differently from in-state firms-a
fact question."'"n
108 Id. at 1110.
109 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112 ("[Tlhe Twenty-first Amendment limits the
effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the
delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its borders .... (quoting
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996))).
110 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112.
111 Id. (citations omitted).
112 Id. at 1115.
113 id.
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E. The Seventh Circuit Goes Against the Norm--or Does it?
Despite the relative uniformity in the decisions of the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, the Seventh Circuit
reached a different result. In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson,
Indiana consumers challenged a state statute that prohibited the direct
shipment of out-of-state alcoholic beverages directly to Indiana
consumers. 114 The court noted that like many states, Indiana had the
three-tier structure of alcohol distribution with different classes of
permits for each group within the chain of distribution. 1 5 Indiana
permitted local wineries, but not wineries from another state or
country, to ship directly to consumers." 6
The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the temperance
battle fought by the states before Prohibition and examined how
states dealt with the dormant Commerce Clause in light of liquor
regulation. 1 7 Noting the Supreme Court's decision in Leisy v.
Hardin,18 the court held that the dormant Commerce Clause could
not be used to shield interstate shipments from state regulation."
9
The crux of the court's argument was that every use of
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment would be discriminatory
because every statute limiting importation would affect shipment and
distribution of certain alcohol. 120 For example, if Indiana were trying
to regulate cheese with this scheme, and not alcohol, that court
recognized that this would not be permitted because of the conflicts
with the Commerce Clause.! 21 However, the court held that Section 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment empowers Indiana to control alcohol
in a manner that it cannot control other products. 122
114 Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2000).
115 Id. at 851.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 851-52.
118 Id. at 852. The court found that the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts
expanded the power of the States to regulate liquor shipments, especially given the
close parallel of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Webb-Kenyon Act. Id. See
also Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (permitting States to regulate liquor once
it was removed from its original package).
119 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 852.
120 Id.; see also Eng, supra note 63, at 1886.
121 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
122 Id.
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In turning its attention to the Indiana laws, the court held that
Section 2 has been deemed a violation where the laws have imposed
a discriminatory condition on importation i.e., favoring an Indiana
winery over an out-of-state winery. 123 However, because Indiana
required that all alcohol pass through their three-tier system and be
subjected to state taxation, the law did not discriminate against out-
of-state wineries.
1 24
The court recognized that both in-state and out-of-state permit
holders could deliver wine directly to consumers.12 5 For example,
wines from Indiana and Illinois have to be re-imported through an
Indiana wholesaler or retailer before they reach the consumer.1 26
Moreover, the plaintiffs in this case were not concerned with whether
the distribution permits were limited to Indiana's citizens.' 27 Rather,
the plaintiffs were concerned with direct shipments from out-of-state
sellers who did not have, or want, permits. 28 The court found,
however, that all alcoholic beverages, whether in-state or not, had to
pass through the system and be taxed. 129 Because this excise tax
applied equally to in-state and out-of-state sellers, no discrimination
existed.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Indiana law because
the regulatory scheme required that all alcohol-in-state and out-of-
state-was required to pass through the system. 31 With the Seventh
Circuit's ruling, and the conflicting decisions by the other four
circuits, the direct shipment issue appeared ripe for the Supreme
Court to grant writ of certiorari. However, the Court required yet
another decision before doing so.
123 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853 (construing IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a)
(1998) and differentiating the Indiana law with the law in Bacchus Imp. by noting
that § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes this activity unless they favor
in-state over out-of-state). See Bacchus Imp., 468 U.S. at 265.
124 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 854
127 id.
128 id.
129 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
130 id.
131 id.
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IV. Swedenburg v. Kelly-Oenophiles possible answer to
the direct shipment dilemma?
In Swedenburg v. Kelly, two out-of-state wineries and three
consumers brought suit seeking a declaration that the New York
direct shipment law was unconstitutional. 132 The New York statute
allowed in-state wineries, but not out-of-state wineries, to ship
directly to consumers.'33
New York implemented a three-tier system similar to the
majority of states. 134 A major policy objective for the law was that
"[n]o person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail
any alcoholic beverage within the state without obtaining the
appropriate license" 3f To obtain a winery license, a winery had to
pay the fee set by the state and had to maintain an in-state branch,
factory or warehouse.' 36 A benefit of this license was that not only
can the winery ship to another licensed winery, wholesaler or retailer,
but it could also ship directly to consumers. As the court noted, the
New York law was unique because it permitted out-of-state wineries
to distribute and sell alcohol in New York as long as they complied
with the state's licensing requirements.138
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and held that it was unconstitutional to require an out-of-
state winemaker to "become a resident in order to compete on equal
terms."' 39 On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized the preceding
circuit court decisions and stated that all the cases had something in
common: each involved a challenged state law that permitted in-state
wineries and prohibited out-of-state wineries from shipping directly
132 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3600, 72 U.S.L.W. 3722, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No.
03-1274).
133 Id. at 228.
134 Id.
13 Id. (citing N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 102(l)(c) (2000)).
136 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228 (emphasis added) (construing N.Y. ALCO.
BEV. CONT. LAW § 3(37) (2000)).
137 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229 (construing N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§
76(4), 77(2) (2000)).
138 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229.
139 Id. at 230 (quoting Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F.Supp.2d 135, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
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to consumers. 140 The court acknowledged that four circuit court cases
used the North Dakota analytical framework and agreed that under
this analysis, a state law is unconstitutional if it imposes burdens on
interstate commerce that do not outweigh the local gains if non-
discriminatory alternatives exist. 141 For the second step of the test,
the traditional view is that a statute can be saved only if it furthers a
core concern. 14 2 However, the Second Circuit declined to follow the
framework established in the previous decisions and explained that
"the two-tiered approach is flawed because it has the effect of
unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated to the states through
the clear and unambiguous language of Section Two." 14
3
The Second Circuit discussed why the dormant Commerce
Clause should not be prioritized over the Twenty-First Amendment
because the history of the amendment parallels the Webb-Kenyon
Act. 144 Combined with the states' power to regulate shipments of
alcohol granted by Section 2, the dormant Commerce Clause could
not be used to invalidate shipment laws. 145 Therefore, the court
rejected the argument that the statute must either regulate in a non-
discriminatory manner or be without any non-discriminatory
alternatives and advance a core concern of Section 2 in order to
stand. 146
The court then considered the impact of early Twenty-First
Amendment cases where the states had the power to regulate the
alcohol industry, even when those regulations "operated to the
disadvantage of out-of-state interests." The state laws could not
violate the liberties of individuals protected by other portions of the
Constitution 148 and could not strike down the Commerce Clause with
140 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 230-31 ("In each of the four circuit court cases,
the regulatory scheme at issue was found to be facially discriminatory in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
141 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 230-31 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003)).
142 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231.
143 id.
'44 Id. at 232-33. See discussion infra Part Il.B (discussing the transition from
the Wilson Act to the Webb-Kenyon Act to the Twenty-First Amendment).
145 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 232-33.
146 Id.
141 Id. at 234.
148 Id.
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respect to all alcohol transactions. 149 However, even though the court
agreed with these precedents, the Second Circuit held that each case
had "unequivocally reaffirmed" that Section 2 permits each state to
regulate alcohol transportation within its borders and that this
"created an exception to the Commerce Clause."' 50
The Second Circuit's analysis found the New York laws only
regulated the importation and distribution of alcohol within the state
of New York.' 5' The circuit court noted that "New York treats wine
importers the same as it treats internal sellers; all must either utilize
the three-tier system or obtain a physical presence from which the
state can monitor and control the flow of alcohol."'' 52 The Second
Circuit conceded that this would cause dormant Commerce Clause
problems if it involved some product other than alcohol with the
potential to lead to efficiency problems.' 53 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the regulatory laws were "within the ambit of the powers
granted to the states by the Twenty-First Amendment."'
' 54
V. Analysis of the Wine Debate
A. Second's Circuits Misapplication of the Bridenbaugh
Formulation
The Second Circuit made a bold ruling in holding that New
York's regulatory scheme was constitutional, contrary to four circuit
court rulings. Specifically, the Second Circuit deviated from
traditional jurisprudence on the conflict between the Twenty-First
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause by not implementing
the two-step approach. 55 In the prior five circuit decisions, four of
the circuits had followed the approach by analyzing the state law
under the dormant Commerce Clause and then determining whether
149 Id. at 235 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage, 377 U.S. 324, 331-32
(1964)).
150 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 236 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206
(1976)) (emphasis added).
151 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 237.
152 Id. at 237-238.
... Id. at 238.
154 Id. at 239.
155 Id. at 230-31.
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the statute could be saved under Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment. 156 The Bridenbaugh court did not directly perform a
two-step analysis because the Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana
law was not discriminatory and thus there was not a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.' 57 Unlike the Second Circuit, the
Bridenbaugh court did not find the analysis "flawed," but rather
failed to find that a conflict existed.
58
Additionally, the Second Circuit held that judicial precedent
established that each state has the unequivocal power to regulate
alcohol within its borders.' 59 While this is accepted by all
jurisdictions, 60 the true conflict arises when the state regulations
burdens interstate commerce. When state laws have placed out-of-
state products at an economic disadvantage due to geographical
origin, an analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause is required.
16 1
Perhaps most importantly, the Second Circuit applies--or
more accurately, misapplies-the Bridenbaugh analysis in their case.
The court cites Bridenbaugh for the proposition that every use of
Section 2 can be considered discriminatory. 162 However, this
156 See Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231 ("Four circuits have struck down the
regulatory schemes in question, utilizing a two-step analytical framework, similar
to that used by the district court here...").
15' Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853-54.
158 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231 ("We think this two-step approach is flawed
because it has the effect of unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated to the
states through the clear and unambiguous language of Section 2.").
159 Id. at 236-37.
160 See Heald 342 F.3d at 522 (recognizing that states can regulate alcohol
within their borders "unfettered" by the Commerce Clause." (quoting Ziffrin, Inc.
v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939)); Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112 (maintaining
that the "Twenty-First Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce
Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating
beverages within its borders." (quoting Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 516 (1996)); Beskind 325 F.3d at 513 (holding that the passing of the Twenty-
First Amendment did take away some commerce clause power and let the states
regulate the alcohol industry within their borders); Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 404
(holding that the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment did remove some power
of Commerce Clause from regulating the state alcohol industry.).
161 See e.g., Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514 ("As prohibited by the 'dormant'
Commerce Clause, discrimination means simply "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."
(citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99)).
162 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 233 ("[Elvery use of § 2 could be called
'discriminatory' in the sense that ... every statute limiting [interstate] importation
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statement was made by the Seventh Circuit in defense of the
regulation of alcohol within state borders.' 63 As a clarification, the
Bridenbaugh court held that the Twenty-First Amendment could not
be used to discriminate against out-of-state alcohol producers.' 64 As
the Fifth Circuit noted in Dickerson, "[tihe dispositive fact in
Bridenbaugh was Indiana's equal application of its three-tier system
to all alcoholic beverages, regardless of where such beverages were
produced." 165 Moreover, the plaintiffs in the Bridenbaugh case were
consumers-not out-of-state wineries.1 66 This changed the analysis
from analyzing discrimination to the out-of-state wineries, which the
court did not address, to whether there was any consumer
discrimination. Furthermore, the statute in Indiana required that
"every drop of liquor" pass through the three-tier structure.' 68 In New
York, the exemption permitted in-state wineries to bypass the three-
tier process while out-of-state wineries were still required to follow
the scheme. 69 As the court noted in Heald, this provided the in-state
wineries with a competitive advantage that out-of-state wineries
could not obtain.1
70
The Second Circuit was misguided when it contended that
out-of-state wineries could obtain this benefit.' 71 The district court
correctly asserted that it would require the out-of-state winery to
become an in-state resident by having a branch, factory or warehouse
leaves intrastate commerce unaffected." (citing Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853)).
163 See Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 233 (discussing how § 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment gives states "virtually complete control" of the liquor distribution
scheme); See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) (holding that states control the structure of its liquor
distribution).
164 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853 ("[T]he central purpose of [§ 2] was not to
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition."
(quoting Bacchus Imp., 468 U.S. 263, 267)); Miller, supra note 8, at 2540.
165 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 401 (emphasis added).
166 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849-50.
167 id.
168 Id. at 853.
169 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229 (construing N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW §§
76(4), 77(2)) (2000)).
170 See Heald, 342 F.3d at 521 ("In-state wineries can, for example, bypass the
price mark-ups of a wholesaler and retailer, making in-state wines relatively
cheaper to the consumer and allowing them to realize more profit per bottle.").
171 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 238.
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within the state. 172 Despite New York providing an out-of-state
winery the opportunity to ship directly to consumers, this opportunity
comes at the high price of requiring an out-of-state winery to become
an in-state winery. 173 The circuit court rationalized its view by
holding "[w]hile it may be an additional expense for out-of-state
wineries to be present in New York, they gain access to a market not
available to others--direct sales to consumers., 174  This is
discrimination based on geographical origin and satisfies the
definition of facial discrimination according to the dormant
Commerce Clause. 175
B. Impact on Consumers
The regulatory schemes created by the states have caused
consumers to bear the burden of higher prices. When the out-of-state
winery ships to the wholesaler, the wholesaler adds its shipping cost
and profit margin to the product before selling this to the retailer.
1 76
Sometimes the markups by wholesalers take as much as eighteen to
twenty percent of their selling price on wine as profit.'
77
Additionally, the retailer must add its markup to turn a profit, which
is often as high as twenty-five percent.1 78 Prohibiting out-of-state
wineries from shipping directly to consumers and forcing them to go
through a three-tier system is causing the profit margins and shipping
costs of the wholesaler and retailer to be passed on to the
consumer. 179
Additionally, the circuit courts have offered alternatives that
172 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229-30.
173 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 237 ("All wineries, whether in-state or out-of-
state, are permitted to obtain a license as long as the winery establishes a physical
presence in the state.").
174 Id. at 238.
175 See Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514 ("rals prohibited by the 'dormant' Commerce
Clause, discrimination means simply differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." (quoting
Or. Waste Sys, Inc., 511 U.S. at 99)).
176 Lorde Martin, supra note 30, at 64.
177 Stephanie Athrens Waller, Bacchus Rules: Recent Court Decisions on the
Direct Shipment of Wine, 40 HoUs. L. REv. 1111, 1122 (2003).
178 Id.
179 See Lorde Martin, supra note 30, at 64 (stating that "the overhead imposed
by the three-tier system is too expensive.").
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may prove more costly to consumers.° In Beskind, the court noted
that one way for the states to ensure the constitutionality of their
regulatory schemes would be to require the in-state wineries to be
regulated under the three-tier system.' 81 However, the ultimate effect
of this rationale would result in increased costs for in-state wines
with consumers bearing the burden of the additional costs. Out-of-
state wineries continue to battle with states over the depth of the
exemptions from the dormant Commerce Clause as each state highly
values its autonomy in regulating the alcohol industry within its
borders. However, history has established that Congress and the
federal judiciary play a critical part in resolving conflict whenever
states step outside of their boundaries and burden interstate
commerce. 82
The circuit court cases illustrate the uncertainty surrounding
the clash of these provisions. The United States has a history of free
market economics, traditionally permitting natural supply-demand
principles to control the price and flow of goods within our country's
borders.183 The ambit of the Commerce Clause cannot be questioned
regarding the regulation of such commerce. However, the state does
possess justifiable reasons to keep alcohol regulation within their
power, such as safety, taxes, temperance and uniformity. 84 Yet,
when such statutory schemes infringe on the rights of consumers and
constitutionally guaranteed authority, the schemes must be found
unconstitutional.
Moreover, the burden on consumers may have indirect effects
on other markets as a result of the Internet revolution. Each year,
more individuals turn to e-commerce to make purchases in an easier
180 See, e.g., Beskind, 325 F.3d at 515 (stating that there were at least two non-
discriminatory alternatives to the discriminatory measures used by North Carolina).
181 Id.
182 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (holding that the
"negative aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that
is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors.").
183 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) (determining
that "the premise, well established by the history of the Commerce Clause," is that
"this Nation is a common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the
free flow of both raw materials and finished goods in response to the economic
laws of supply and demand.").
'84 North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432.
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and more efficient manner.' 85 The Internet connects-consumers from
across the United States, presenting both companies and consumers
alike with more choices. r86 By increasing the supply available to
consumers of products, this creates a natural market reaction of
reduced prices."187 Additionally, companies will be able to benefit
from cross country sales through cost efficient measures such as more
productivity, less advertising and fewer personnel. 188 The flow of
goods purchased on the Internet across state borders will continue to
provide more options to both consumers and companies, resulting in
a mutually beneficial system to both sides.' 89
C. Potential Solutions
The first alternative is to forbid the direct shipment of all
wine, which will 1revent some consumers from having access to their
favorite products. 90 However, this will result in the in-state wineries
being subject to the heightened costs out-of-state producers currently
185 Douglass, supra note 6, at 1619 (stating that "[g]rowth in mail-order and
electronic commerce, however, has provided new channels through which
consumers and producers or retailers can reach each other.").
186 Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L.J.
1045, 1053 (2001) (determining that "[t]he Internet allows consumers greater
choice in products and services-a positive impact that is difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify-as well as the ability to find the least expensive and most
suitable products and services.").
187 See Litan, supra note 186, at 1049 (discussing that "[tihere is a remarkable
consensus among economists about the virtues of unrestricted trade-namely, that
it will lead to lower prices, improved quality, and higher overall wages (due to
enhanced productivity.")).
188 See generally id. at 1052 (reasoning that "[there is a widespread consensus
among economists that advances in high technology-especially computers, the
prices of which have been falling at an annual clip of roughly thirty percent per
year-have been a major reason why productivity has increased rapidly.").
189 See id. at 1053 (stating that "commercial activity using the Internet is
widely expected to be counted in the trillions of dollars, here and worldwide, in just
a few years.").
190 See Douglass, supra note 6 at 1652 ("State laws that absolutely prohibit
direct shipment from both in-state and out-of-state producers to consumers require
close scrutiny in balancing the states' exercise of core Twenty-first Amendment
powers with the primary purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. States insist
that Prohibition of direct shipments is necessary to prevent minors from accessing
alcoholic beverages, to maintain an orderly alcoholic beverage distribution system,
and to promote temperance.").
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bear, resulting in an overwhelming negative effect on consumers. The
more reasonable alternative for consumers and states is to permit the
direct shipment of wine from both in-state and out-of-state wineries.
Permitting direct shipment to consumers will provide the most
economically productive option. This process will eliminate the
discriminatory treatment, satisfy the consumers by eliminating the
expense-adding middle-men and continue to permit the states to
regulate the industry. However, states are almost certain to balk at the
total exclusion of wine from their three tier regulatory scheme, given
how much they rely on the system for tax revenue and regulatory
compliance.191 However, permitting in-state and out-of-state wineries
a small, uniform exception will benefit both parties. This exception
will help to subsidize the small market businesses in the alcohol
industry. To avoid a decrease in tax revenue, the states may tax the
wineries on the direct shipment amounts that are in excess of the
permitted exception. This option would most likely be supported
because states have the power to tax; because it would not be facially
discriminatory, the tax would most likely be upheld under the
balancing test analysis.192 In addition, this small exception will not
result in significant backlash from wholesalers because the wineries
will not be selling on a large scale. Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, this exception will still permit states to maintain control
over the alcohol industry within their borders while avoiding a
dormant Commerce Clause violation.
VI. Will The Supreme Court Come To The Winers'
Aid?
The Supreme Court, sensing that this conflict may continue
without a final ruling, granted writ of certiorari in the Swedenburg
case. 193 The state legislators contend that by prohibiting the direct
191 See Sana Loue, The Criminalization of Addictions, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 281,
298-99 (2003) (finding that almost three percent of the United States' disposable
income went towards alcohol spending. In addition, Loue notes that "[aiccordinglv,
excise tax revenues have risen consistently from approximately $7.7 billion in 1970
for the beer, wine, and distilled spirits industries combined, to approximately $16
billion in 1995."). Given the amount of money spent on alcohol, the states ability to
tax this measure results in significant tax revenue for each state.
192 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 602 (discussing how taxes
that are not facially discriminatory but have incidental effects on interstate
commerce are analyzed under the more lenient balancing standard).
193 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 72
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shipment of alcohol, they can protect the integrity of their state
distribution systems and regulate first hand within their borders.
194
Congress believes these regulations have effects on interstate
commerce, an area which no party will argue is solely within their
power to regulate. 195 Given-the notable conflict presented by recent
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court will likely resolve this issue once
and for all.
Although some believe that the Supreme Court may pursue
multiple avenues in its decision, 196 the Court will essentially be
forced to choose between permitting the exclusion to in-state
wineries and finding the schemes unconstitutional. Based on the case
history of this conflict, the Supreme Court will likely find these state
regulatory schemes unconstitutional. The Second Circuit was the first
court to challenge the traditional view of the conflict between the
Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. While
the amendment gives states the autonomy to regulate the alcohol
industry within their borders, 97 the state regulatory schemes favoring
in-state wineries are facially discriminatory. Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution provides specifically enumerated powers to the
federal government that are solely within their province to
U.S.L.W. 3600, 72 U.S.L.W 3722, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No.
03-1274).
194 See John Foust, State Power to Regulate Alcohol under the Twenty-First
Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First Amendment
Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. REv. 659, 665-66 (discussing history of states desires
to regulate the alcohol industry).
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
196 See generally Eng, supra note 63, at 1890 (stating that the U.S. Supreme
Court has four approaches they can take to their decision: (1) The Bridenbaugh
approach where Judge Easterbrook concluded that § 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment was designed to provide relief to the states and the proper guide to use
is not core concerns, but the history of the Constitution. Bridenbaugh ultimately did
not have to address this issue as Indiana required all alcohol to pass through their
system, (2) The Bolick (and Beskind) approach, which explicitly rejected the
Bridenbaugh view and applied the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
(3) Bainbridge district court analysis, where the court applied the two-tier test, but
determined whether the discriminatory impact by a state scheme is authorized
under the Twenty-First Amendment (this approach was vacated by Bainbridge
above), and (4) The Heald district court approach where the court held that even if
there was a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First
Amendment would offer enough protection to uphold the state regulation).
'97 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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perform. 198 This power was not removed due to the passage of the
Twenty-First Amendment. 199 Moreover, given that the amendment
only permits regulation within a state's borders, when the effects of a
state's regulatory scheme go beyond their boundary, the law is, in
effect, regulating a different state's business. This thrusts at the heart
of the original rationale Justice Johnson alluded to in Gibbons v.
Ogden for the inclusion of the Commerce Clause in the first place: to
harmonize the economy of the nation.200
VII. Conclusion
The circuit courts have failed to reach a consensus in solving
the debate over the direct shipment of wine. With the Supreme Court
granting writ of certiorari in the Swedenburg case, the circuits will
finally have a definite ruling on the direct shipment of wine from out-
of-state wineries. Although the Second Circuit's view of the New
York's statutory scheme deviated from five prior circuit court cases
and thus marked a departure from traditional jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court will likely reinstate the two-step analysis applied
above. A major concern that will remain after this anticipated ruling
is the impact of the Court's decision on consumers, and whether
states will amend their regulatory schemes to either the benefit or
detriment of their citizens.
198 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1630 (discussing the plain meaning of
Section 2). There is no explicit Constitutional language repealing the power of
Congress to regulate commerce in § 2.
200 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 395 ("If there was any one object riding over every
other in the adoption of the [C]onstitution, it was to keep the commercial
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints." (quoting
Justice Johnson in Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 231)).
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